Whamit!

The Weekly Newsletter of MIT Linguistics

Issue of Monday, March 2nd, 2026

LF Reading Group 3/4 - Alma Frischoff (MIT)

Speaker: Alma Frischoff (MIT)
Title: Non-maximal readings of definite plurals with positive and negative predicates
Time: Wednesday, March 4th, 1pm - 2pm
Location: 32-D461
 
Abstract: I discuss the availability of non-maximal readings of sentences with definite plurals, focusing on antonym pairs of predicates. First, I draw attention to the observation that antonyms like clean/dirty and healthy/sick differ in whether they favor existential or universal interpretations, particularly when combined with definite plurals (e.g., Krifka 1996; Yoon 1996). Second, I point out that presupposition triggers like stop and start exhibit similar patterns in both their presupposed and asserted content. I argue that if these pairs are analyzed as consisting of a predicate and its negation (at least at some abstract level), both phenomena can be understood in terms of the asymmetry between positive and negative sentences in the availability of non-maximal interpretations, as observed by Bar-Lev (2021). Therefore, such an analysis points to a broader, systematic asymmetric pattern of non-maximality, sharpening the question of whether this pattern follows from the mechanism deriving non-maximality or from more general cognitive tendencies.
 

LingLunch 3/5 - Dean McHugh (University of Edinburgh)

Speaker: Dean McHugh (University of Edinburgh)
Title: Conditional Modality with Alternatives
Time: Thursday, March 5, 12:30pm - 2pm
Location: 32-D461

Abstract: This talk brings together two ideas. First, that statements under a modal are interpreted as conditional antecedents. ‘Possibly A’ states that if A were true, there would be some case where the relevant ideals are met. Dually, ‘necessarily A’ states that if A were false, there would be no case where the relevant ideals are met. Second, conditional antecedents are interpreted via sets of alternatives, with some items—such as disjunction and ‘any’—introducing multiple alternatives. Combining them returns, in a uniform and automatic way, a solution to three challenges facing the standard theory of modality: free choice inferences, independence inferences, and counterexamples to substitution of logical equivalents.