Complex Reflexives & the Principle A Problem

The English data in (1) illustrate that anaphors are sensitive to Principle A, Chomsky (1981). It is debatable whether Principle A should be expected to apply to the examples in (2). One could argue that in (2), his pathetic self is a noun phrase where self is a noun, therefore subject to Condition C; whereas in (1), himself is an anaphor and thus sensitive to Principle A.

(1) a. John saw himself (in the mirror) \textit{Sensitive to Principle A}
   b.* John knows that Maria saw himself (on the reality show)

(2) a. John saw his pathetic self (in the mirror) \textit{Not sensitive to Principle A}
   b. John knows that Maria saw his pathetic self (on the reality show)

In Greek and Kutchi Gujarati it is not immediately obvious that self is lexically ambiguous in the above sense. Both the unmodified self and the modified self forms look identical apart from the presence or absence of the adjective, shown in (3) and (4). Thus, it seems appealing to assume simply one, non-lexically ambiguous self (at least for Greek and Kutchi Gujarati).

(3) a. O Costas, vlepi [\textit{ton} eaftos, \textit{tu}]  
Costas, sees det \textit{self,m.sg 3.m.sg}
“Costas, sees himself;”

b.*O Costas, xeri oti Maria vlepi [\textit{ton} eaftos, \textit{tu} ]
Costas, knows that Maria sees det \textit{self,m.sg 3.m.sg}
“Costas, knows that Maria sees himself;”

c. [I mitera tu Janni,] agapai [\textit{ton} alithino eaftos, \textit{tu}]
3.f.sg.nom mother Janni,gen loves \textit{3.m.sg.acc true self, 3.m.sg.gen}
“Jannis,‘s mother loves his true self;”

(4) a. John, [\textit{e-na} potha,\textit{ne}] joyo  
John, 3.sg.gen \textit{self}-acc see.pfv.m.sg
“John, saw himself;”

b.*John, kidthu ke Maria [\textit{e-na} potha,\textit{ne}] joyo
John, said that Maria 3.sg-gen \textit{self}-acc see.pfv.m.sg
“John, said that Maria saw himself;”

c. Valji,ni ma [\textit{e-na} sacho potha,\textit{ne}] prem kare
Valji,gen mother 3.sg-gen true \textit{self}-acc love do
“Valji,‘s mother loves his true self;”

I argue that the meaning of self in these languages cannot be identity (i.e. conveying that the subject and object are identical), and propose a less conservative meaning, equivalent to a part of relation (i.e. the object is a part of the subject). I follow Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) who claim (for Greek), that the anaphor (when unmodified) obligatorily incorporates into the matrix verb, giving rise to Principle A effects. The proposed syntactic and semantic analysis ultimately reduces Principle A to locality: self-incorporation of unmodified self yields a symmetric relation triggering Principle A effects; self-incorporation of modified self is blocked (by independent syntactic constraints), resulting in the absence of Principle A effects. This is the correct, and desired result.